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Realism and resources: Towards more explanatory economic 
evaluation  
Abstract 
To be successfully and sustainably adopted, policy-makers, service managers and 
practitioners want public programmes to be affordable and cost-effective, as well as 
effective. While the realist evaluation question is often summarised as what works for whom, 
under what circumstances, we believe the approach can be as salient to answering 
questions about resource use, costs and cost-effectiveness - the traditional domain of 
economic evaluation methods. 
This paper first describes the key similarities and differences between economic evaluation 
and realist evaluation. It summarises what health economists see as the challenges of 
evaluating complex interventions, and their suggested solutions.  We then use examples of 
programme theory from a recent realist review of shared care for chronic conditions to 
illustrate two ways in which realist evaluations might better capture the resource 
requirements and resource consequences of programmes, and thereby produce 
explanations of how they are linked to outcomes (i.e. explanations of cost-effectiveness). 
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Introduction 
 
The ‘core hypothesis [of every programme] is always as follows: if we provide 
these people with these resources it may change these behaviours.’ 
(Pawson, 2003, p.472). Nothing as practical as good theory. 
‘There is likely to be a greater role for qualitative research methods in helping 
address many of the limitations of experimental approaches [including] to explore 
variation in users and interventions, and to better understand the nature of the 
interventions C Furthermore, greater attention to how, why and for whom 
interventions work can help strengthen the validity of a study, by specifying the links 
between inputs and outcomes, and improve generalisability, through a better 
understanding of the context in which a particular intervention is likely to be cost-
effective.’ 
 (Byford and Sefton, 2003, p.107). Economic evaluation of complex health and 
social care interventions. 
Like other theory-driven evaluation methodologies, the starting point for realist evaluation is 
to identify and express how and why the outcomes of social interventions or programmes 
are caused (Pawson, 2013, Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Pawson and Tilley, 2004).   That is, 
such approaches tend to be based on expectations and explanations of greater 
effectiveness than alternative programmes or current service arrangements  Yet, to be 
successfully adopted and implemented, policy-makers, service managers and practitioners 
also want interventions and programmes to be affordable and cost-effective (in their locality, 
with their organisational structure, their professional staff mix, and within their budget etc.). 
The established evaluation methods which assess cost-effectiveness, or the efficiency of 
interventions, are economic evaluations (Drummond et al., 2005). 
The primary question that drives realist evaluations is typically expressed as what works for 
whom, under what circumstances and why, and we believe the approach is as salient to 
answering questions about costs and cost-effectiveness  (Anderson, 2004, Anderson and 
Shemilt, 2010).  Realist evaluation makes prominent the role of invisible or intangible 
mechanisms, and we propose that the central conception of mechanisms as being both 
reasoning and resources implies that a potential focus on ‘economic’ mechanisms, contexts 
and outcomes – or on economic aspects of each of these - is consistent with the overall 
approach.  
This paper aims to: 
• Provide a brief recap of realist evaluation and a brief introduction to economic 
evaluation methods 
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• Describe the key similarities and differences between economic evaluation and 
realist evaluation. 
• Provide an argument that most economic evaluations – at least as they are 
conducted in health care – are archetypal ‘black box’ evaluations, with minimal 
interest in how and why a particular configuration of resources (an intervention) 
changes outcomes, which has important consequences for the generalisability and 
use of their findings. 
• Summarise what health economists see as the challenges of evaluating complex 
interventions, and therefore what approaches or adaptations should be adopted for 
conducting economic evaluations of them. 
The paper will conclude by proposing the likely main features and practical challenges of 
realist economic evaluation and arguing that integrating explanations of resource use and 
cost-effectiveness can be done within realist evaluations.   
While our research experience (and our worked example of shared care) draw on our 
backgrounds as health services researchers and economic evaluators, we hope that the 
arguments and illustrations made in this paper are accessible to evaluators in other sectors.  
Similarly, we hope that the paper will be interesting and accessible to both health 
economists curious about the implications of realist evaluation for enhancing the 
generalisability of their economic evaluation findings, and realist and other evaluators 
interested in extending their evaluations to explain costs and cost-effectiveness. 
What are realist evaluations? 
Realist evaluations are a form of theory-driven evaluation that aim to explain how policies, 
programmes and interventions work, who they work for, in what circumstances and why 
(Pawson, 2013, Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Pawson and Tilley, 2004),  Recognising that no 
one policy, programme or intervention will always work, all the time, for everyone, realist 
approaches seek to explain this pattern of outcomes through building programme theories 
about how an intervention (policy or programme) is meant to work (often according to 
programme architects, or policy-makers, or  participants), and then ‘test’ whether and how 
this programme theory plays out in the real world using empirical data. .   
Within realist evaluation policies, programmes and interventions are not just a ‘treatment’, 
they are theories incarnate. The theories are the assumptions, perspectives, hunches and 
hopes in the policy maker’s head and often this theory is not articulated but remains hidden 
in the ‘black box’ of the intervention.  Black box evaluations make no attempt to uncover or 
elucidate the causal connections between the inputs and tangible components of an 
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intervention and its expected outcomes (Lipsey, 1993).  Theory-driven evaluation in contrast, 
including realist approaches, seek to ‘open up the black box’; in order to “identify the causal 
processes that theoretically intervene between programme treatment and outcome”  
(Astbury and Leeuw, 2010).  In this way, realist evaluation moves from describing what 
works, to explaining who it works for, in what context and why.  Realist evaluation becomes 
an act of theory development and refinement.   
Realist evaluation is based on a generative model of causation; that is, that there are 
mechanisms which bring about change, that exist independently of us being able to see 
them, but when circumstances are right, we see their effects, and from those observations 
can deduce what might be causing the change.  In social policies, programmes and 
interventions, there is always an underlying reason why it is felt that a particular approach 
will be effective.  What realist approaches aim to do is make explicit the underlying theory 
behind the intervention, and what the mechanism(s) is (or are) that is bringing about the 
change.   
The methods used in realist evaluation are plural, as the focus is on developing and refining 
programme theory.  Often quantitative data (e.g. from randomised controlled trials or 
surveys) are useful for describing the pattern of outcomes, and then qualitative data useful 
for understanding in more detail why something did or did not produce the expected 
outcomes.  
What are economic evaluations? 
In health care and other public service sectors economic evaluation is an umbrella term 
which encompasses a range of different evaluation methods, including cost-benefit analysis 
and cost-effectiveness analysis (Drummond et al., 2005, Layard and Glaister, 1994).  As the 
hyphenated labels imply, all these evaluation methods involve the simultaneous comparison 
of both the costs and the value/impacts of the programmes or interventions being evaluated.   
Another defining feature is that economic evaluations should involve the comparison of two 
or more programmes or interventions.  They are fundamentally a decision-informing method 
or option appraisal tool, usually for a particular jurisdiction or policy maker at a given time.  
While in lay language it is possible to say something “is cost-effective”, to economists and 
economic evaluators an intervention or programme can only ever be cost-effective relative to 
some other intervention or programme, or doing nothing (although, doing or changing 
nothing usually still has cost and other consequences). 
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How are they different from realist evaluation? 
The approach of realist evaluation and the methods of economic evaluation could not be 
more different.  Economic evaluation has evolved as a highly pragmatic decision-informing 
form of quantitative summative evaluation.  While it is mostly conducted by people with a 
training in economics, it only partially draws upon a few key economic concepts and 
principles.  The basis of economic evaluation methods in mainstream economic theory, in 
particular in welfare economics, are often claimed but also contested (Drummond and 
Maguire, 2001, Garber, 1996).  Welfare economics is the branch of economic analysis which 
has developed principles and methods for informing societal (e.g. government) decisions 
that aim to maximise welfare at a societal level.  For a good introductory description of 
welfare economics, and of the ways in which health economic evaluation methods are based 
on it, please see chapter by Tsuchiya and Williams, in Drummond and Maguire, 2001.  
However, for a contrasting view, that economic evaluation actually developed more 
pragmatically as a technique of applied engineering and decision analysis, Garber et al 
(1996) have said that “only recently have economists sought to graft cost-effectiveness 
analysis to theoretical roots in welfare economics.”(p.26). 
We have compared the main features of realist evaluation and economic evaluation in Table 
1 below.  Looking at these many differences, it is unsurprising that any combined, or even 
complementary use, of the two approaches has only rarely occurred. 
Table 1. Economic and realist evaluation compared 
 Economic evaluation Realist evaluation 
Theoretical 
basis 
Ostensibly, welfare economics;  
in practice more pragmatic and 
makes selective use of core 
economic concepts (e.g. cost-benefit 
principle, opportunity cost, marginal 
analysis) 
Realism
a
: 
reality is both observable and external, 
and how it is interpreted 
Conception of 
causality 
Not generally known or discussed 
(but, implicitly, successionist 
causation: i.e. A causes B; seeking 
empirical regularities that intervention 
A is or is not cost-effective) 
Generative notion of causation: 
outcomes are contingent on a range of 
underlying mechanisms, occur at 
different levels of reality, and will only 
ever only manifest as ‘demi-regularities’ 
Research aim To produce estimates both of costs 
and effectiveness in a specific context 
(e.g. alongside a specific 
effectiveness study) or a particular 
decision-making jurisdiction (model-
based economic evaluation) 
To develop and refine programme 
theories (i.e. potential explanations) 
about how and why interventions work 
(i.e. produce beneficial outcomes), 
including how and why they work 
differently in different contexts 
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Policy aim To inform specific decisions amongst 
a defined number of alternatives  
To inform decision-makers about the 
way that the intervention produces its 
effects, and what modifies or influences 
that effectiveness  
Type of data Quantitative (especially: resource 
use, unit costs, final (e.g. health) 
outcomes). 
Secondary research data only as part 
of decision modelling 
Quantitative and qualitative depending 
on the specific knowledge gaps.  Often 
quantitative to establish the outcome 
pattern, and qualitative to determine 
how and why this pattern occurs. 
Secondary research (e.g. realist 
reviews) may complement primary 
research (e.g. for theory development 
stage) 
Preferred study 
design? 
Either: 
Experimental evaluation (e.g. 
randomised controlled trial) 
Or: 
Decision analytic (simulation) 
modelling, synthesising assumptions 
and cost and effectiveness evidence 
from variety of sources 
Pluralist – no strongly preferred method 
or design (research question 
dependent) 
(although for some realist researchers, 
randomised experimental methods are 
seen as incompatible with realist 
conception of causation and mode of 
explanation) 
Generalisability/ 
transferability? 
Emphasis on transferability of results 
(e.g. similar cost-effectiveness) 
contingent upon key features of 
context (country, patient group) 
Generalisation is through progressively 
applying the programme theory to other 
contexts.  Realist approaches 
recognise that the explanations 
developed from a realist evaluation are 
always open to further development 
and refinement.   
Footnotes: 
a  Originally, in Pawson and Tilley, 1997 (Chapter 3), the basis of realist evaluation was 
described as scientific realism.  In the preface of his 2013 book Ray Pawson explains how 
his terminology has evolved to be ‘some type of realism’, while others may see realist 
evaluation as more closely aligned to, for example, critical realism. 
Measurement vs explanation/theory-building 
Perhaps the most notable difference between economic evaluation and realist approaches to 
evaluation is that realist approaches aim to build generalisable causal explanations of 
particular programmes, policies or services whereas economic evaluations essentially aim to 
measure or estimate the cost-effectiveness of introducing a particular programme.  In the 
context of a trial-based economic evaluation this difference is most marked.  The ‘economic 
evaluation component’ of a randomised trial will tend to only (a) collect data on the types and 
amounts of resource use (e.g. staff time, equipment, medicines, additional training) involved 
in providing the different interventions, and (b) collect data on any altered resource use 
associated with changed outcomes (e.g. patients with improved health should need less 
medication and fewer hospital or primary care visits).  This is why some health economists 
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have criticised current methods of economic evaluation as unhelpfully intervention-focussed 
and outcomes-driven, often to the exclusion of considerations of context (Birch, 2002, Birch 
and Gafni, 2003). 
Creating localised vs generalisable knowledge 
There is a key difference between the primarily decision-informing goals of economic 
evaluation and the primarily theory- and generalisable knowledge-generating purpose of 
realist evaluation (Anderson and Shemilt, 2010).  Model-based economic evaluations are 
always based on informing a well-specified policy choice in a given locality, country or other 
jurisdiction.  Similarly, trial-based economic evaluations only yield a cost-effectiveness 
estimate in relation to the types of patients, interventions and settings included in that study 
(Sculpher et al., 2006).  The generalisability of the findings of economic evaluations is known 
to be highly constrained by a wide range of contextual and other factors, and not least 
because resources cost different amounts in different places and times, and because the 
opportunity cost of particular resources will vary according to the decision context (and 
therefore the alternative potential use of those resources) (Anderson, 2010, Sculpher et al., 
2004). 
In summary, economic evaluations, as currently designed and conducted, are largely 
atheoretical exercises in measuring or estimating the inputs (resources and costs) and 
outcomes (effectiveness) of interventions and their comparators (Anderson, 2010, Birch, 
2002, Lessard, 2007, Sculpher et al., 2004).  While their full description of interventions and 
comparators is improving, they are often - in the health field at least - experimental and 
dominantly positivisit in approach; they can easily be characterised as ‘black box’ 
evaluations. That is, very few have any definite interest – or therefore any planned data 
collection - in the intervening causal mechanisms or relevant contexts that are thought to 
produce the expected improvements in outcomes or generate changes in resource use, or 
link them to each other.  Thus, where there are several economic evaluations of ‘the same’ 
complex intervention or prevention programme, there is usually neither a clear result that 
one programme is consistently the most cost-effective in all contexts, nor evidence that can 
explain how and why the cost-effectiveness of intervention X or programme Y varies so 
much from context to context.  This is what Pawson and Tilley referred to as ‘the Martinson 
problem’ – that nothing works (or is cost-effective) consistently - writ large (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997) (p.30).  A number of respected and experienced health economists share these 
views about the explanatory weaknesses of conventional economic evaluation methods, and 
also point to the need for more theory-driven approaches as the likely solution (Birch, 2002, 
Birch and Gafni, 2003, Coast, 2000, Drummond, 2010). 
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However, some economic evaluations are based on quite elaborate simulation models of 
long-term costs and outcomes of alternatives (decision models, or decision analytic models).  
While decision model-based economic evaluations are an apparent exception to the criticism 
that economic evaluations are black-box and atheoretical (because such simulation 
modelling at least provides an explicit framework of some of the supposed causal pathways 
and key trade-offs involved in a particular policy choice), they are not generally recognised 
as a form of theory development or theory-testing. This is in part because relations within 
model-based economic evaluations are mathematical expressions of assumed relationships, 
rather than causal propositions that could be discretely tested.  Until the development of all 
decision models is based on more comprehensive and distinct processes of theory 
development, and perhaps can accommodate causal connections in non-mathematical ways 
and better capture the influence of contexts, then it seems to us they will only ever be a 
partial reflection of the theory-driven approach of realist evaluation. 
Unsurprisingly, those health economists who have begun to confront the explanatory 
limitations of current methods of cost-effectiveness analysis, are those who have experience 
of conducting economic evaluations of complex interventions (such as models of service 
delivery, health policies or public health programmes). Below, in Box 1, we summarise the 
various challenges identified by health economists in evaluating complex health 
interventions. 
Box 1. Challenges in the economic evaluation of complex health interventions 
Conceptual challenges: 
• Inevitability of multiple outcomes, including greater importance of some intermediate 
outcomesa or non-health benefitsc Some important outcomes may not be expected or 
known at the beginning of an evaluation or may occur at system rather than 
individual level e 
• Difficulty attributing outcomes to interventions and/or transferring findings to other 
settings or populations with confidence d 
• Greater difficulty in defining appropriate alternatives for comparison (In particular, the 
issue of whether new services should be evaluated as alternatives to or additional to 
existing service arrangements) a 
• Greater importance of issues surrounding the scale of services (For example, in 
order for some types of community-based services to “become” cost-effective, they 
may have to handle enough patients for the alternative hospital service to be 
downsized) b 
 
Practical challenges: 
• The use of established (e.g. clinical) outcome measures often not feasiblea d 
• Incomplete identification of relevant costs, e.g. omission of capital costsa 
• Timing of evaluation of (newly introduced) services or programmes.b Evaluation too 
early, and service operating under full capacity may underestimate effectiveness.  
Conversely, new or pilot projects may have higher levels of funding or staff 
enthusiasm/champions (e.g. investing extra time freely). b Interventions in complex 
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systems may only create step-changes in outcomes after long periods eThe cost of 
whole services or public health programmes often falls on different budgets.  Cost 
savings in one area cannot always easily be re-invested elsewhere d   
 
Key to sources: a (Godber et al., 1997) b (Coast, 2000) c (Payne et al., 2013) d (Weatherly 
et al., 2009) e (Shiell et al., 2008) 
In summary, most health economists have seen the challenges of evaluating complex 
interventions as ones which can be mainly tackled by either more comprehensive data 
collection or more sophisticated decision modelling or statistical techniques (Payne et al., 
2013, Payne and Thompson, 2015, Sculpher, 2001).  A few others, however, have 
acknowledged that the lack of conclusiveness and poor usefulness of economic evaluations 
is more deeply rooted in a dominantly positivist or clinical-epidemiological conception of how 
interventions generate outcomes, and which poorly recognises context, complexity or the 
active role of programme participants in producing outcomes (Birch, 2002, Byford and 
Sefton, 2003, Coast, 2000, Shiell et al., 2008).  When health economists have suggested 
that greater use of theory might be part of the solution, they have typically advocated using 
complex systems theory in a broad sense rather than expanding the use of programme 
theory of the specific intervention type being evaluated (Lessard, 2007, Shiell et al., 2008). 
What would more explanatory economic evaluation look like?  
The following proposal for a more theory-driven approach to economic evaluation is based 
on discussions and presentations about this idea over the past five years, and also 
experiences of conducting a realist review of a complex intervention – shared care for 
chronic conditions, conducted by the present authors.  In some ways it extends to empirical 
evaluation some of the realist-inspired ideas about conducting reviews of economic evidence 
suggested earlier.  Our experiences suggest two main extensions to existing guidance on 
the design and conduct of realist evaluations.   
First, we propose that the conception of mechanisms within realist evaluation, as a 
combination of both the changed resources offered and participant’s reasoning/responses to 
those resources, be more fully and consistently articulated.  This is because all mechanisms 
are to some extent economic (in the sense that they entail altered resources) but not all of 
these changes in resources have salient or substantial economic consequences (i.e. not all 
will involve opportunity costs, not all will require monetary investment).  This first extension 
to the approach of realist evaluation is an endorsement of Dalkin et al’s recent call to more 
fully disaggregate resources and reasoning when uncovering programme mechanisms 
(Dalkin et al., 2015), and that a realist evaluation that does this should go some way towards 
yielding explanations of cost and cost-effectiveness as well as effectiveness. 
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Second, we propose that there is value in identifying underlying ‘cost-effectiveness’-specific 
programme theories where they can be identified.  By this we mean programme theories 
which explicitly seek to explain cost-effectiveness or altered costs.  This will often be the 
case when, for example, a new model of care delivery (like shared care) is not necessarily 
believed to be more effective than current care, but rather is advocated because it is 
expected to be less costly while not affecting effectiveness or safety etc.  In these situations, 
programme or service change designers will often express a number of ways in which they 
expect the new programme or service to be less costly or more efficient.  These can often be 
captured as more generic programme theories, which we illustrate with the examples in the 
following section.  
Programme theories of cost-effectiveness – a worked example 
To illustrate the feasibility and value of developing cost-effectiveness-specific programme 
theories, we present selected findings from a recent realist review of the cost and cost-
effectiveness of shared care we have conducted (Hardwick et al., 2013).  While this was not 
a prospective realist evaluation of shared care, it demonstrates our main proposal that (a) 
discrete programme theories of cost-effectiveness can be identified in relation to a particular 
type of programme or health service (b) that these can sometimes be expressed in terms of 
mechanisms-contexts-outcome configurations, and (c) that it is possible to identify what 
outcomes, contexts or changes would need to be assessed in order to prospectively 
evaluate how and why a new shared care programme is or is not cost-effective. 
Shared care is a way to manage the care of people in relation to a particular health 
condition, when the level of severity and/or stability of their condition means that optimal 
care requires the planned involvement of both primary care and specialist care professionals 
and services (Hickman M et al., 1994, Smith et al., 2007).  It has been most used for patients 
with long-term chronic conditions such as asthma, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure 
and depression. A shared care programme will typically comprise the following components:  
1. An agreed shared care protocol for the defined group of patients (which defines: the 
roles and responsibilities of primary care (e.g. GP) and disease specialist care 
professionals, and of patients and carers; the frequency and nature of monitoring or 
follow-up; and the rules or criteria for referral to different services or professionals) 
2. Enhanced information exchange between disease specialists and generalists/primary 
care health professionals (computerised, paper or telephone) 
3. Care coordination (computer systems and/or dedicated person) 
4. Extra education and/or training (e.g. for GPs in the specific chronic disease, or 
patients in self-care) 
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This can be summarised graphically, as a flow diagram - including some speculative causal 
pathways between the core components of shared care and potential intervening 
‘mechanisms’ which link the components to expectations of optimal care for a given patient 
group (Figure 4). 
Figure 1. Provisional ‘causal map’ of shared care components, mechanisms and 
outcomes 
 
 
To identify programme theories of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of shared care 
we conducted a review of several seminal descriptions of shared care and other descriptive 
and evaluation studies of actual examples of shared care.  Typically, claims and assertions 
about how and why shared care was expected to be more effective or more cost-effective 
than usual care were in the introduction or discussion sections of empirical evaluation 
studies.  Two main programme theories of the effectiveness of shared care were identified: 
the systematisation of high quality care processes, and; the fostering of positive and 
reciprocal working relationships.  A three-part programme theory relating to expected 
efficiency gains due to introducing shared care (i.e. cost-effectiveness) was expressed as 
follows:  
For defined types of patient, if care is shared in a systematic way between particular 
organisations or clinicians working in primary (generalist) and secondary (disease 
specialist) care, then there are efficiency gains within the health system due to: 
(a) Shifting care to less costly settings and/or less expensive practitioners 
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(b) Better tailoring of resources to need 
(c) Enhancing use of patient and carer resources (and thereby substituting for formally 
provided care services) 
These programme theories of the cost-effectiveness of shared care could therefore be 
labelled as ‘shifting’ (to less expensive care settings), ‘tailoring’ (to lowest needed or 
optimally cost-effective level of care) and ‘substitution’ (to care which is effectively ‘free of 
charge’ to the health system).   
It should be noted here that, within the methods of economic evaluation, cost-effectiveness 
is a compound concept – so programme theories of cost-effectiveness should explain how 
both costs and effectiveness are produced and how they are causally linked.  Some 
economic evaluations may dominantly focus on cost differences, but this is typically where 
equal or equivalent effectiveness has been assumed on the basis of existing evidence.   In 
relation to particular models of care, the terms ‘cost-effective’ or ‘efficiency gains’ therefore 
would generally include: care which both costs less and improves health outcomes; care 
which costs less while maintaining the same outcomes; or care which improves outcomes at 
acceptable and affordable additional cost.i 
These three programme theories of shared care can be expressed graphically, as shown in 
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 below.  Each graph shows total clinical contact minutes per 
year (i.e. staff resource consumption) against the severity of a patient’s chronic disease 
(running from high severity at graph origin, to lower severity – and where severity is really 
shorthand for any aspects of a patient’s condition that justifies more specialist input).  The 
absolute values are not meant to be accurate, but merely to illustrate some 
interrelationships.   
Under usual care (Figure 2), there is typically a positive association between disease 
severity and the amount of clinical contact time a patient receives – on average, the more 
severe or unstable a patient’s condition the more clinical contact time they should receive.  
Also, above a particular threshold level of severity it is assumed the patient’s clinical care for 
this chronic condition would shift from being wholly managed in primary care to being wholly 
managed in secondary/specialist care (e.g. regular hospital outpatient/ambulatory care visits 
to a consultant diabetologist, respiratory physician or psychiatrist).  This diagram also 
assumes that being wholly under specialist clinical care would entail more clinical contact 
minutes during a typical year (perhaps because routine GP or practice nurse appointments 
are usually shorter than the typical hospital specialist outpatient appointment, and/or 
because more severe or unstable patients may require more frequent follow-up). 
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With the programme theory of shifted care, there is a group of patients with moderately 
severe disease –who under usual care would be cared for only by disease specialists - 
whose optimal care involves mainly primary care clinical visits but with the care protocols, 
enhanced information exchange and care coordination of shared care requires much less 
frequent contact with disease specialists (Figure 2).  These less frequent contacts with 
specialists might be either planned (e.g. following initial referral/diagnosis and for initial 
treatment planning, or at regular review intervals), or unscheduled instances where 
symptoms change or treatment needs reviewing for other reasons (e.g. referred ‘back’ to the 
specialists according to criteria in the shared care protocol).  In turn, if specialist 
appointments are provided by more highly paid clinicians (e.g. hospital consultants) or in 
more expensive settings (e.g. hospitals) than GPs/nurses working in primary care, then this 
shift in the combination of resources used would lead to cost savings (at least on the basis of 
changes in staff mix/ clinical care setting, if ignoring any additional costs of introducing and 
supporting shared care). 
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Figure 2.  Usual care and ‘shifted’ care: hypothetical clinical contact time by disease 
severity 
 
 
If shared care is more cost-effective through care being more tailored to need, then it 
reflects that for a group of patients with moderately severe disease the optimum mix of 
specialist care and primary care input and contact time can vary widely – anything between 
almost all clinical care being provided by disease specialists, to almost all care being 
provided by the GP or other primary care practitioners.  In other words, there is a more 
gradual reduction of specialist input to care for patients who have less severe or more stable 
disease, while at the same time the level of care from primary care increases (until, perhaps, 
specialist care is only required when treatment fails or symptoms worsen considerably).  
Note that this graph only shows the staff time resource aspects of this possibility.  In the 
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longer term, the cost-effectiveness of tailoring also depends on the degree to which greater 
input from disease specialists actually leads to more effective treatment monitoring and 
decisions in relating to changing or complex clinical needs. 
Figure 3.  ‘Tailored care’: clinical contact time by disease severity 
 
Our third programme theory to explain the potential efficiency gains of shared care asserts 
that greater self-care and self-monitoring by patients would reduce the need for formal care 
and monitoring appointments from a health professional (i.e. substitution).  If such resource 
substitution takes place, and the evaluation aims to assess costs to the health or public 
sector, then there would be directly reduced costs of care services.  Figure 4 shows the 
potential savings due to increased self-care in addition to those of shifted care.  It also 
shows such substitution as only affecting those patients under shared care; but of course 
there might be ‘spillover effects’, if some of the extra support and improved skills for self-care 
and home monitoring is given to all patients under the care of the same GPs or primary care 
practices. 
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Figure 4.  ‘substituted care’: clinical contact time by disease severity 
 
 
Refining the theories of cost-effectiveness 
In this section we describe what evidence we discovered in published economic evaluations 
of shared care in relation to two of these three programme theories: care shifting and care 
tailoring.  While this evidence comes from conventional economic evaluations which were 
not explicitly theory-driven or realist in approach, we believe these worked examples usefully 
illustrate how prospective studies could generate relevant data to refine such programme 
theories in a particular health systems setting and patient group, and with a particular 
specification of shared care. 
Cost-effectiveness by care shifting - evidence and key contexts 
The shifting of care to less costly care professionals or to less costly clinical settings appears 
to occur in two main ways within shared care.  Firstly, many shared care protocols stipulate 
a recommended frequency of routine follow-up tests and visits to monitor a patient’s health 
and, where necessary, adjust treatment.  This typically involved nearly all follow-up 
appointments in primary care, with a GP or practice nurse, rather than regular follow-up a 
hospital-based specialist.  So, for example, in a cost-effectiveness analysis of shared care 
for people with hepatitis C in Queensland Australia, usual specialist-based follow-up required 
15 hospital appointments over a period of a year (Anderson & Haas, 2001).  Under shared 
care, there were still 15 follow-up visits scheduled, but nine of them would be with the 
patient’s GP.  If attendance at appointments is beneficial, and GP appointments are 
considerably cheaper than hospital specialist appointments (as is often the case), then such 
savings are effectively ‘hard-wired’ into the shared care protocol.   
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Note the possible intermediate mechanism of adherence to attending appointments, which 
may modify the cost differences due to shifting care, or increase effectiveness if greater 
follow-up appointment adherence leads to more effective monitoring and treatment.I  In the 
evaluation of shared care in Queensland, interview evidence strongly suggested that follow-
up by more geographically local (and possibly better known or trusted) GPs had led to 
substantially higher levels of follow-up and adherence to treatment.  Such regular follow-up 
was especially critical given the potential psychiatric side-effects of the drugs being taken by 
the patients with hepatitis C.     
The cost-effectiveness studies of shared care also suggested another extension of the 
underlying programme theory of shifting care, which involves a shift in the balance of 
planned versus unplanned care.  As part of the planned shift to primary care appointments, 
other supporting aspects of shared care such as a patient register and recall system often 
increase planned attendance for monitoring and follow-up overall.  This should, in theory, 
lead to better monitoring and any necessary treatment changes, and therefore a better 
managed condition.  This in turn can lead to fewer or less severe acute episodes (e.g. 
asthma attacks, hypoglycaemic episodes, episodes of depression), and an associated 
reduction in unplanned or urgent appointments primary care or hospital appointments.  The 
hypothetical causal chain of this more specific version of the care shifting programme theory 
is shown in Figure 5 below. 
But does the evidence from economic evaluations support this theory?  For the economic 
evaluations of shared care in the UK in the 1990s, this seemed to be the case.  While there 
was not evidence relating to all of these steps in all studies (most did not distinguish planned 
from unplanned visits), where the comparator was usual hospital care then with shared care 
primary care visits increased while specialist appointments decreased (see bar charts in 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  Cost savings due to a better managed condition 
 
 
These lower numbers of specialist or emergency care appointments, probably through better 
planned monitoring and treatment changes, might lead to considerable cost savings, 
especially if any urgent treatment for acute episodes also usually occurred in hospital or with 
specialists.  But the differences between the cost of a specialist appointment in hospital and 
a GP appointment were not always large, so this might reduce the cost savings associated 
with these shifts in appointment patterns.   
Sometimes however, shared care represented a shift towards more, rather than less, 
disease specialist involvement; in these cases shared care was meant to provide higher 
access to specialists for patients from primary care, and thereby greater costs.  This was 
often the case with shared care for depression in the United States (often called 
‘collaborative care’), where the comparator in evaluations was typically usual primary 
physician care.  Unsurprisingly, this was associated with higher in costs – albeit often with 
improved outcomes (between 30% higher and double the cost of usual care in such studies 
(Pyne et al., 2010, Rost et al., 2005, von Korff et al., 1998)).  Thus, in the context of 
previously under-met need for disease specialist care, shared care was often cost-
increasing.   
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In two of the evaluations of shared care for mental health in the United States, better 
tailoring of care to needs was an explicit aim of shared care (Rost et al., 2005, von Korff et 
al., 1998).  In Rost et al. this was expressed more as what could be called ‘temporal 
tailoring’; more regular scheduled contact with patients was primarily to encourage 
‘continued treatment adherence when symptoms were resolving, to adjust treatment if 
symptoms were not resolving, and to terminate treatment which patients in remission did not 
require’ (p8). These studies suggested this was especially important for effective treatment 
of people with depression. 
In von Korff et al, the expression of tailoring was less explicit and (in the care model aims) 
more couched in the terms of ‘improved management’ (von Korff et al., 1998).  However, 
there was also evidence of a care tailoring mechanism at work: ‘Collaborative Care patients 
were more likely to be switched to new medications, often a selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor [SSRI], as their care progressed because of the closer follow-up that Collaborative 
Care patients received’ (p.145).  So, in this case (assuming the previous medications were 
older, cheaper and less effective than SSRIs) tailoring could be viewed as ‘tailoring up’. 
The potential patient benefits of tailoring could be limited or non-existent if the actual range 
of treatments or levels of treatment were not available.  For example, in the Pyne et al,. 
study, treatment tailoring was limited to altering medication, without any opportunities for 
offering psychological or counselling based therapies (for which there are known patient 
preferences).  Also, in the same study, the authors believed that the effectiveness of stepped 
collaborative care model was limited because it did not tackle common co-morbidities of 
depression (such as pain, anxiety and substance abuse; p.819, (Pyne et al., 2010)) 
In some studies there was some data on the measures of variance (e.g. standard 
error/deviation) for numbers of visits or other units of service use.  Wider variances might 
provide indirect support that shared care is leading to more tailoring – that is, perhaps under 
shared care, the same patient group show wider variation in their service usage rates 
(implying that either some are getting more or some are getting less than under usual 
alternative care).  Other, more direct, evidence of tailoring would come from documenting 
the frequency of treatment changes, or changes in the pattern of follow-up monitoring. 
Whether driven by clinical considerations or by patient preferences, better tailoring to need 
seems to be a well-recognised mechanism of many models of health care improvement.  
However, better tailoring of care to need can only, by definition, be as cost-effective as the 
specific treatments and monitoring strategies that people get at each ‘level’ of care provided.  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Our experience from conducting our systematic review of the cost-effectiveness of shared 
care suggests two complementary approaches for using the logic of realist inquiry to explain 
differences in costs and cost-effectiveness between different models of care, or other 
complex interventions.  First, we have shown that for some types of programme or service 
change, it is possible to specify cost-effectiveness-specific programme theories.  In fact, 
some of these programme theories of cost-effectiveness – for example, better tailoring of 
care to need – are so closely linked to notions of efficiency that it could be argued they are 
more like Pawson’s notion of transferrable ‘conceptual platforms’, and so they might be 
applicable to explaining the cost-effectiveness of a wide range of programmes or service 
changes (Pawson, 2013).   
As well as being able to specify such cost-effectiveness-specific theories for shared care, we 
have shown that it is possible to express some of them in terms of mechanisms, relevant 
contexts and particular outcomes (i.e. the basic components of realist explanation-building).  
A possible exception to this might be when care (e.g. follow-up appointments) is directly 
shifted to less costly settings or practitioners, or when some component of an intervention 
(e.g. access to a specialised drug) is both very costly and unique to the new intervention.  
Arguably, to explain the resulting cost difference due to ‘shifted care’ or similar situations 
requires not so much theory as basic arithmetic.  However, we believe such deterministic, 
linear ‘hardwiring’ of cost differences will not be a feature of all complex interventions, and 
many other determinants of resource use will be more multi-level, variable, behaviour-
dependent and more context-sensitive and therefore require a more realist logic of inquiry to 
elucidate them. As well as our example, others have begun to use cost-effectiveness 
specific programme theories within realist reviews (Charles et al., 2013, Charles, 2014) or 
using realist evaluation to explain ‘economic interventions’, such as policies regarding fees 
to access care (Marchal et al., 2013). 
The second approach, which could complement the development and refinement of cost-
effectiveness-specific programme theories, involves raising recognition that all three of the 
main components of realist explanations – contexts, mechanisms and outcomes – can either 
require additional resources in order to exist, or impact on resources.  This endorses and 
extends Dalkin et al’s recent argument that the realist notion of mechanism should more 
clearly disaggregate the mechanism reasoning and mechanism resources.  Where realist 
evaluators may need to learn more, is how resources consumed in different decision 
contexts, or at different overall volume, affects whether and how much there is actually an 
opportunity cost for those resources. 
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Considering these suggested approaches together, we do not suggest a new sub-genre of 
‘realist economic evaluation’.  This would, we believe, unhelpfully and artificially separate 
evaluations and explanations of effectiveness from cost-effectiveness (including 
explanations of changing patterns of resource use).  Our main conclusion is that these goals 
will always be inextricably linked and are therefore best evaluated together.  In a way, the 
common realist expression of what a programme theory is (reasoning and resources – as 
captured by the Pawson quotation at the beginning of this paper) already firmly 
acknowledges this.  Instead, we think that evaluations could more explicitly theorise and 
capture the resource requirements and consequences of hypothesised programme 
mechanisms, outcomes and contexts.  Such process evaluations are now increasingly 
encouraged and funded alongside effectiveness evaluations of complex interventions, 
including greater endorsement that they should be theory-driven, at least in the UK (Moore 
et al., 2014)   
Another conclusion from our review and analysis, is that the cost-effectiveness of generic 
models of care like shared care can only be as cost-effective as the underlying treatments 
and chronic disease monitoring strategies around which their protocols are built.  If ‘stepping 
up’ a patient with depression to a stronger and more expensive drug and more frequent 
monitoring by psychiatric specialists does not reflect additional effectiveness of that new 
treatment, and better management of side-effects through the closer monitoring, then in this 
case the cost-effectiveness of sharing care will be undermined.  Unfortunately, in different 
chronic disease areas even the knowledge about the relative cost-effectiveness of existing 
treatments is often poor. 
For existing realist evaluators, this is neither rocket science, nor hardcore economics; for 
example, the hypothetical ‘mechanism’ of more experienced practitioners making quicker yet 
more effective treatment decisions, will have the expected resource consequence of shorter 
clinical encounters, but at the expense of higher pay rates per minute as the additional (or 
marginal) ‘cost’ of applying this greater clinical experience.  These things can often be 
measured, or at least observed at some level.  However, other aspects of complex health 
and social interventions do raise additional quite specific challenges for understanding 
resource use and economic evaluation.  Issues of scale affect both effectiveness and costs.  
Varying decision contexts (including different budget constraints) also mean that the same 
services or programmes can have quite different opportunity costs in different places and 
populations.  Furthermore, people in different countries and cultures may value health, non-
health and equity outcomes differently (especially where the primary outcome may be 
information, rather than health or other more measurable outcomes).  
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Progress in this area of evaluation more fundamentally needs a larger community of 
economic evaluators and economists willing to learn about and try out realist approaches in 
their evaluative studies. Equally, progress also needs more realist evaluators who are both 
undaunted by the jargon of economic evaluation methods and keen to fully theorise the role 
resources play in intervention mechanisms, contexts and outcomes.  While our insights and 
this paper have drawn upon our own experiences of trying to understand complex health 
interventions, the imperative of cost-effectiveness and efficiency as goals is also central to 
other areas of policy evaluation and organisational management.   In these other policy 
areas, the methodological habits, home disciplines and epistemological starting points of 
economic evaluators may make them more amenable to using realist and theory-driven 
evaluation approaches than seems to be the case in health and medical research (where, 
arguably, the experimental imperatives of clinical epidemiology have been the dominant 
methodological influence on economic evaluation methods).  And of course, as well as 
extending knowledge and skills into perhaps unfamiliar territory, evaluators will also simply 
need more time or access to additional data sources in order to broaden their focus to 
resources and costs; only then will they be able to evidence the underlying mechanisms and 
contexts that seem to explain patterns in them.  Research funders too will need to recognise 
this.   This way we might increase confidence that full exploration of programme theories of 
effectiveness should produce explanations of cost differences and cost-effectiveness as an 
inevitable and valuable by-product. 
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 Footnote 
                                               
i
 At a health system level, efficiency gains might also be seen to arise if lower health outcomes are 
achieved alongside yielding sufficient resource and cost savings, which would – or at least could - be 
reinvested elsewhere in the system to achieve greater health gains than those lost – for example in a 
different service and patient group.  However, in reality, for service reorganisation interventions in 
established publicly funded health systems, providing care of reduced effectiveness is generally 
politically unacceptable and more unlikely).   
